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The Hon Bruce Atkinson MLC The Hon Telmo Languiller MP 
President Speaker 
Legislative Council Legislative Assembly 
Parliament House Parliament House 
Melbourne Melbourne 
 
 
Dear Presiding Officers 
 
Under the provisions of section 16AB of the Audit Act 1994, I transmit my report on the 
audit Tendering of Metropolitan Bus Contracts.  
The audit examined whether the state has effectively secured value for money from the 
new Melbourne Metropolitan Bus Franchise (MMBF) arrangements. It assessed the 
planning and conduct of the MMBF tender, and the management of the resulting contract. 
The audit also examined the state’s progress in reforming future metropolitan bus contracts. 
I found that the state has not yet secured full value for money from the MMBF 
arrangements. While the contract resulted in cost savings of $33 million in 2013–14, cost 
savings alone are note sufficient to demonstrate value for money. In particular, the 
contract's potential has not yet been realised due to Public Transport Victoria's (PTV) failure 
to resolve longstanding issues impacting the implementation of the related performance 
regime. 
A further concern is the Department of Economic Development, Jobs, Transport and 
Resources’ and PTV’s slow progress in preparing to reform the remaining metropolitan bus 
contracts, which are expiring in 2018. This risks compromising the state’s immediate 
opportunity to leverage better value from these services. 
 
Yours faithfully 
 
John Doyle 
Auditor-General 
6 May 2015 
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Auditor-General’s comments 
Buses are a vital part of Melbourne’s public transport system. For approximately 
80 per cent of households, they are the only readily accessible form of public 
transport. This is particularly the case for Melbourne’s middle and outer suburbs, 
where buses provide cross-town transport, local services and critical links to the rail 
network. As these services cost Victorians around $1 billion per year, it is vital that 
the state receives the best value possible for this money. 
However, my recent audits, Coordinating Public Transport (2014) and Developing 
Transport Infrastructure and Services for Population Growth Areas (2013) have 
highlighted significant shortcomings with these services due, in part, to deficient 
contractual arrangements which offer minimal incentives for improving services.  
Specifically, these audits found that many of Melbourne’s bus routes currently have 
long wait times, indirect routes, and do not operate on schedules designed to 
harmonise well with the rail network or other bus routes. These issues are 
longstanding and reduce the usefulness of bus services for commuters and impede 
patronage growth. 
In this audit, I examined whether the state has effectively secured value for money 
from the new Melbourne Metropolitan Bus Franchise (MMBF) which was 
established in 2013 to deliver around 30 per cent of Melbourne’s bus services. The 
MMBF agreement is fundamentally different to any other contracting arrangement 
within Melbourne’s bus network as it contains strengthened incentives and 
penalties designed to drive improvements in bus services. 
I examined the planning and conduct of the MMBF tender, as well as Public 
Transport Victoria’s (PTV) management of the resulting contract. I also examined 
the state’s progress towards reforming the remaining metropolitan bus contracts—
covering around 70 per cent of services—that will expire in 2018. 
I found that the state has not yet secured full value for money from the MMBF 
agreement despite achieving almost $33 million in cost savings in 2013–14. This is 
because PTV has failed to: 
• resolve longstanding data reliability issues impacting the operation of the 
performance regime by April 2015 when it was due to be fully implemented 
• withhold payments for instances of non-performance to encourage timely 
corrective action 
• reach a timely agreement with the operator on the standard for determining 
incentive payments for improvements in bus patronage. 
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PTV needs to strengthen its management of the MMBF contract and urgently 
address longstanding data reliability issues as this situation is compromising its 
capacity to reliably assess and manage the operator’s performance. 
Of particular concern is the Department of Economic Development, Jobs, Transport 
and Resources (DEDJTR) and PTV’s slow progress towards reforming the balance 
of metropolitan bus contracts. These contracts have never been exposed to open 
market competition as historically they have been renewed with the incumbent 
operators. Their expiry in 2018 therefore means the state is now rapidly 
approaching a critical juncture.  
My predecessor’s 2009 audit Melbourne’s New Bus Contracts highlighted that 
procurement and reform options needed to be presented to government as a 
matter of urgency, as any change in the delivery arrangements for these services 
will require extensive planning and lead time to assure the availability of critical 
assets and infrastructure. However, progress on this initiative has been slow as 
initial planning to address these issues has only recently commenced. 
Consequently, the state risks having its options in 2018 severely curtailed due to a 
lack of time to substantively progress these reforms, meaning it may be forced to 
again renegotiate with incumbent operators. 
This scenario, should it eventuate, represents the worst possible economic 
outcome for the state. It would compromise the immediate opportunity to leverage 
better value for the $1 billion spent on bus services each year. 
I have made 13 recommendations to address these issues. The recommendations 
reinforce the need for PTV to remedy the problems with performance data and 
contract management. I also urge PTV and DEDJTR to present future reform 
options to government as a matter of urgency. 
I intend to monitor implementation of these recommendations, and will follow up 
with PTV, DEDJTR and the Department of Treasury and Finance (DTF) to ensure 
appropriate measures have been taken. 
I wish to thank the staff in PTV, DEDJTR and DTF for their constructive 
engagement throughout the audit process. 
 
John Doyle 
Auditor-General 
May 2015 
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Audit summary 
Buses are a significant form of public transport, providing cross-town transport, 
local services and links to the rail network. They are often the only readily 
accessible form of public transport available for people living in Melbourne’s middle 
and outer suburbs.  
Public Transport Victoria (PTV) oversees public transport operators. It is 
responsible for managing all bus service contracts, which currently cost the state 
around $1 billion per year. 
Melbourne’s bus network is extensive—it consists of more than 300 routes 
covering over 5 500 kilometres, and is serviced by approximately 1 700 buses. 
These services are delivered by 12 private operators comprising of:  
• 27 contracts with 11 operators, renegotiated in 2008 with longstanding 
incumbent providers. These contracts, which expire in 2018, cover around 
70 per cent of metropolitan bus services, are largely fee-for-service, and 
contain minimal performance incentives and penalties. 
• A new contract established in 2013 through an open competitive tender with a 
single operator covering around 30 per cent of services. This contract, known 
as the Melbourne Metropolitan Bus Franchise (MMBF) agreement, differs 
from the other arrangements as it contains a suite of performance incentives 
designed to improve bus services, patronage growth and customer 
satisfaction. The contract, worth around $1.7 billion, expires in 2023. 
PTV leveraged competitive tension in the market when establishing MMBF, 
expecting this would result in a better service for customers at a reduced cost to 
the state. A related aim of this approach was to eventually extend this reform to all 
metropolitan bus services by using MMBF to assess the savings possible through 
increased competition, and to demonstrate the benefits of a performance-based 
contract. 
The previous government approved the use of an open tender for establishing the 
MMBF agreement in September 2011. In so doing, it determined that the MMBF 
agreement would be considered as having achieved value if it: 
• reduced costs for the state 
• delivered improved services for more customers 
• progressed reform of the wider bus industry. 
Objectives of this audit 
This audit examined whether the state has effectively secured value for money 
from the MMBF. It assessed the planning and conduct of the MMBF tender, and 
PTV’s management of the resulting contract. The audit also examined the state’s 
progress in preparing to reform future metropolitan bus contracts.  
Audit summary 
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Conclusions 
The state has not yet secured full value for money from the MMBF despite 
achieving almost $33 million in cost savings.  
While the project to establish the MMBF contract was based on sound planning 
and was run in accordance with Victorian Government Purchasing Board (VGPB) 
requirements, the contract’s potential is not currently being realised due to PTV’s 
failure to resolve longstanding issues impacting the implementation of the related 
performance regime. 
PTV needs to urgently address the lack of reliable performance data, as it 
compromises its capacity to effectively manage the contract, and achieve the 
state’s broader reform objectives. 
The Department of Economic Development, Jobs, Transport and Resources 
(DEDJTR) and PTV’s slow progress in preparing to reform the 27 private 
metropolitan bus contracts which are expiring in 2018 is of particular concern. 
Despite the scale and complexity of this exercise, and the significant opportunity 
cost to the state from failure, substantive planning to address these issues has only 
recently commenced.  
Urgent and sustained action is required, to avoid limiting the state’s procurement 
options in 2018, and compromising any opportunity to leverage better value from 
these services through increased competition. 
Findings 
Performance of the MMBF 
Although the MMBF has been operating for over 18 months, it cannot yet be 
determined whether it is achieving all of its objectives and full value for money for 
the state.  
MMBF expenditure for 2013–14 was almost $33 million, or 18 per cent, less than 
the amount PTV estimated it would have spent if the previous contracts had 
continued. 
However, MMBF cost savings alone are not sufficient to demonstrate that value for 
money has been achieved as this relies on the contract also delivering improved 
services to more customers.  
The MMBF contract establishes an incentive and penalty regime to drive 
achievement of the operator’s service improvement obligations. Effective 
performance monitoring by PTV is therefore critical to ensure these obligations are 
met, and to realise the contract’s full potential. 
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While the MMBF performance regime is conceptually sound, PTV has yet to 
effectively implement it. In particular, PTV has failed to: 
• reach a timely agreement with the operator on the standard for determining 
incentive payments for improvements in bus patronage 
• resolve longstanding data reliability issues impacting the operation of the 
performance regime by April 2015 when it was due to be fully implemented 
• withhold payments for instances of non-performance to encourage timely 
corrective action. 
These circumstances are compromising achievement of the state’s reform agenda, 
including PTV’s capacity to reliably assess and manage the contractor’s 
performance. 
PTV recently advised that full implementation of the performance regime has been 
delayed. 
PTV recognises that overcoming this issue is critical because it will otherwise not 
be able to implement the financial incentives and penalties that are due to begin 
after a total rebuild of the current bus timetable—known as the Greenfields 
timetable.  
It has therefore proposed an alternative method for calculating service reliability 
and punctuality to the contractor, but this had not yet been implemented at the time 
of audit. However, we found that PTV’s proposal is deficient as it relies heavily on 
self-reporting by the operator to determine the reliability of bus services. PTV did 
not have a plan or procedures in place to audit and verify the accuracy of this 
information. 
Urgent action is required by PTV to address this issue as it risks compromising the 
integrity of the performance regime and of related incentive payments. 
Reforming remaining bus contracts 
Progressing broader reform of the remaining 27 bus service contracts will be a 
complex and challenging exercise for the state. These contracts do not contain any 
clear end-of-term rights for the state to run a competitive tender process for these 
services. The state’s right to do so is a longstanding issue that is contested by 
some members of the industry. Any change in the delivery arrangements for these 
services will require extensive planning and lead time to assure the availability and 
transition of any critical assets and infrastructure. 
Our 2009 audit, Melbourne’s New Bus Contracts, recommended that the former 
Department of Transport provide early advice to government on the strategic 
options and constraints for future metropolitan bus contracts. While the department 
and PTV implemented this recommendation for the MMBF, it has not been 
addressed for the next tranche of bus contracts. 
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In July 2014, the former Department of Transport, Planning and Local 
Infrastructure and PTV established a joint working group that commenced initial 
planning for the next round of bus contract procurements. The working group 
commissioned initial research on bus structures in other jurisdictions and potential 
reform options. 
An interdepartmental steering committee comprising PTV, DEDJTR, the 
Department of Treasury and Finance and the Department of Premier and Cabinet 
was also established in early 2015 to inform development of a procurement 
strategy for the government’s consideration by August 2015. 
However, progress on this initiative has been slow. Consequently, the risk is now 
high that a project of this significance, scale and complexity may not be effectively 
planned and delivered in the time remaining.  
In turn, this also risks limiting the state’s options in 2018. If delays mean insufficient 
time is left to pursue an open tender, the state may find that renegotiating with 
incumbent operators is the only option. This will likely compromise any immediate 
opportunity for the state to achieve improved value from these contracts. 
Tendering the MMBF 
The MMBF competitive tender process was guided by appropriate procurement 
principles and probity requirements, and resulted in a contract that is capable of 
delivering improved services and value to the state. 
PTV’s strategic planning for the MMBF procurement was clearly focused on 
producing a value for money outcome, but did not fully comply with required VGPB 
policies and guidance. In particular, PTV did not develop a business case or final 
strategic procurement plan for the MMBF. This created a risk that state decisions 
about the procurement were not soundly based, although our assessment of 
supporting documentation indicates that key costs, benefits, risks and options were 
adequately identified. 
During tender assessment, PTV introduced the targeted improvement process—an 
additional assessment step that was not contemplated in the evaluation plan. 
Despite this, the process was managed in accordance with VGPB requirements, 
and assisted with optimising value from the bids and producing a value for money 
outcome for the state. 
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Managing the MMBF agreement 
PTV’s contract management policies and practices for the MMBF are inadequate 
and are further compromised by the above-noted deficiencies in performance 
monitoring. PTV does not have a complete contract management plan in place for 
the MMBF agreement. While routine tasks and processes are documented in a 
Contract Administration Manual and Process Administration Guides, they do not 
clarify where responsibility lies for specific tasks and key decisions—including for 
resolving complex or contentious issues, the approach for conducting regular 
contract reviews, and the related information management requirements.  
This situation, combined with PTV’s willingness to negotiate extensions to some 
contract deadlines rather than withhold payments or invoke penalties, risks 
reducing the value for money delivered by the contract and undermining 
achievement of the state’s related reform objectives. 
PTV advised that it has only waived the withholding of payments for some delayed 
initiatives which were offered by the contractor and formalised in the contract, but 
which have no impact on core services to customers. However, a key goal of 
introducing the performance-based MMBF contract was to create incentives to 
improve performance. While deadlines may need to be extended in some 
circumstances, the contract enables PTV to reasonably reduce payments in 
response, but it has never done so. This is inconsistent with the goals of the MMBF 
contract and the related reform agenda. 
Additionally, PTV has not assessed the value for money implications of the contract 
variations that have so far been approved. This risks undermining MMBF’s value, 
as it means there is little assurance that implemented variations support 
achievement of MMBF’s objectives. 
Recommendations 
Number Recommendation Page 
That Public Transport Victoria: 
1. promptly rectifies all barriers to implementing the Melbourne 
Metropolitan Bus Franchise performance regime, including 
data reliability issues 
22 
2. documents and assesses the rationale for all decisions to 
waive the withholding of payments for non-performance 
22 
3. closely monitors the delivery of key offer commitments and 
proactively addresses any slippage from contractual time 
lines 
22 
4. systematically audits and verifies the reliability of performance 
data provided by the operator underpinning incentive 
payments.  
22 
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Recommendations – continued 
Number Recommendation Page 
That Public Transport Victoria and the Department of Economic Development, 
Jobs, Transport and Resources: 
5. advise government on all key risks, options and required 
actions for reforming the metropolitan bus contracts expiring in 
2018 
22 
6. develop a business case assessing the cost and benefits of 
alternative reform options and related strategies for all future 
bus service procurements in accordance with Victorian 
Government Purchasing Board guidance. 
33 
That Public Transport Victoria: 
7. separates the role of probity auditor and advisor on future 
procurements. 
33 
That Public Transport Victoria and the Department of Treasury and Finance: 
8. use the lessons from the Melbourne Metropolitan Bus 
Franchise’s targeted improvement process to develop 
guidance on how it may be applied more broadly in future 
procurements. 
33 
That Public Transport Victoria:  
9. ensures that contract management processes are in place 
prior to commencement for any new service contracts 
43 
10. establishes a contract management plan for the Melbourne 
Metropolitan Bus Franchise in accordance with Victorian 
Government Purchasing Board guidance 
43 
11. establishes knowledge management and document control 
processes to ensure critical information and reasons for 
decisions are readily available to the necessary staff 
43 
12. establishes a process for systematically monitoring and 
verifying the completion of required Melbourne Metropolitan 
Bus Franchise contract management tasks 
43 
13. consistently enforces the terms of the Melbourne Metropolitan 
Bus Franchise agreement in accordance with the contract. 
43 
Submissions and comments received 
We have professionally engaged with Public Transport Victoria, the Department of 
Economic Development, Jobs, Transport and Resources and the Department of 
Treasury and Finance throughout the course of the audit. In accordance with 
section 16(3) of the Audit Act 1994 we provided a copy of this report to those 
agencies and requested their submissions or comments. 
We have considered those views in reaching our audit conclusions and have 
represented them to the extent relevant and warranted. Their full section 16(3) 
submissions and comments are included in Appendix A. 
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1   Background 
1.1 Introduction 
1.1.1 The role of buses in Melbourne 
Buses are an important part of Melbourne’s public transport system providing local and 
cross-town travel and connections to rail and tram networks. They also provide an 
alternative to travelling by car. Buses are often the only readily accessible form of 
public transport available for people living in Melbourne's middle and outer suburbs. As 
Figure 1A shows, around 82 per cent of Melbourne dwellings are within 400 metres of 
a bus route compared to around 20 and 30 per cent for trams and trains respectively.  
  Figure 1A
Melbourne dwellings within 400 metres of public transport, 2010 
 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office from Public Transport Victoria's, Network Development 
Plan—Metropolitan Rail, December 2012. 
 
 
 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Local bus SmartBus Tram Train
Per cent
Background 
 
2       Tendering of Metropolitan Bus Contracts Victorian Auditor-General’s Report 
       
 
In the 10 years since 2004–05, metropolitan bus patronage has been steadily 
increasing overall, as Figure 1B illustrates. 
  Figure 1B
Total metropolitan bus boardings by year 
 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office from information provided by Public Transport Victoria. 
1.1.2 Overview of Victoria's bus industry 
Melbourne's bus network is extensive—it consists of more than 300 routes covering 
over 5 500 kilometres, and is serviced by approximately 1 700 buses. The 
arrangements underpinning the delivery of these services are set out in:  
• 27 private contracts with 11 operators established in 2008, covering around 
70 per cent of bus services 
• a contract established in 2013 with a single operator, covering roughly 
30 per cent of services—this contract is the Melbourne Metropolitan Bus 
Franchise (MMBF) agreement. 
In 2013–14, bus services were the second largest transport expenditure for the state. 
As Figure 1C shows, 26 per cent, or around $0.6 billion, of the total paid to transport 
service providers was for operational payments to metropolitan bus service providers. 
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  Figure 1C
Payments to transport service providers 
 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office from information provided by Public Transport Victoria. 
1.1.3 Evolution of Victoria's bus industry 
Private operators 
From 1869 to 1974, bus services were provided by private, self-funded companies 
which developed bus routes, determined their own schedules and fares, and bought 
bus depots and vehicles. In 1974, the government introduced regulated fares across 
the whole metropolitan public transport system and began subsidising bus operators. 
This marked the start of contractual relationships between government and bus 
operators. 
Despite bus operators becoming increasingly financially dependent on state subsidies 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the bus industry retained the view that its history of 
private investment entitled it to exclusive rights to operate the routes they had 
developed. Accordingly, the industry disputes the government's right to competitively 
tender services. However, our 2009 report Melbourne's New Bus Contracts noted that 
the state does not accept this position. The issue has never been legally tested and 
remains a potential risk and barrier to reform.  
The bus industry has not been exposed to the same open market competition as 
Melbourne's other public transport modes. Instead, contracts have historically been 
renewed by negotiating with incumbent operators only. Throughout the 1990s, 
successive reports by the then Industry Commission, the Victorian Commission of 
Audit and VAGO noted that these negotiated contracts lacked incentives for operators 
to minimise costs and improve services.  
State established routes 
In the early 1990s the state sought to increase bus services while setting conditions for 
future bus industry reform. 
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The state established and privatised two companies—the National Bus Company 
(NBC) and Melbourne Bus Link (MBL)—to run new bus services independent of the 
private operators. As the private operators could not claim the same historic ownership 
rights over the routes they operated, the state had more control over the related 
procurement and contracting decisions.  
Further additional routes—the SmartBus orbital routes—were established by the state 
in 2006 under an interim contract with the former Department of Transport, with the 
intention of offering the routes to tender in December 2012.  
2008 bus contracts 
On 1 July 2008, 29 metropolitan bus contracts came into effect. These were 
established through negotiation with the incumbent operators and fell into the following 
two categories: 
• Two contracts covering around 30 per cent of services were let to NBC and MBL 
for a five-year term, from 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2013. These were interim 
arrangements, allowing the state time to run an open tender to establish 
successor operators. The services covered by these contracts are now part of the 
MMBF. 
• 27 contracts for the remaining 70 per cent of services were let to existing private 
operators. These were established for a term of seven years, from 1 July 2008 to 
30 June 2015, with an embedded right to extend a further three years to 2018. 
The 27 contracts for the remaining 70 per cent of services are traditional 
fee-for-service style arrangements, with fixed routes and limited incentives or penalties 
available to encourage performance improvements or innovation. This has not 
changed significantly since the late 1980s.  
1.1.4 Previous audits of Melbourne's bus services 
Previous VAGO audits in 2009, 2012, 2013 and 2014 have highlighted ongoing 
challenges with the delivery and performance of Melbourne's bus services. 
Melbourne's New Bus Contracts, 2009 
This audit focused on the 27 private contracts, and found that while there were likely to 
be significant gains from the new contracts, the state had not fully achieved its 
procurement objectives.  
The key areas identified where the new contract regime failed to deliver on the 
procurement objectives include: 
• an absence of competitive tendering 
• no right to tender existing local services and no agreement to tender at the end of 
contract 
• limited access to strategic assets for government 
• no rights over existing local bus services assets 
• no access to operators’ financial data and open book access for most operators. 
Background 
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The audit also found the operational performance regime for bus services needed to 
be strengthened to provide greater assurance about the on-time running of buses.  
Public Transport Performance, 2012 
This audit examined the performance of public bus, tram and train services across 
Victoria and found that the former Department of Transport was not prepared for the 
rapid growth in public transport patronage between 2004 and 2009. 
The audit also found that information for measuring bus performance fell short of 
expectations for sufficiency and reliability. While the department introduced a rolling 
program of audits of contractual compliance for metropolitan buses, it had not 
implemented VAGO’s 2009 recommendation to use its contractual rights to examine 
and verify operators’ records of on-time running. 
Developing Transport Infrastructure and Services for Population Growth 
Areas, 2013 
This audit assessed the effectiveness of state agencies in planning and delivering 
transport infrastructure and services for population growth areas. It examined whether 
planning effectively identified current and future transport needs, and whether 
implementation and funding strategies supported the timely delivery of required 
transport infrastructure and services. 
The audit found that residents in growth areas generally have less frequent and direct 
bus services compared to those in metropolitan Melbourne. It also noted that 
significant investment of more than $10 billion is required to address the current 
infrastructure and service backlog, and additional recurrent funding of $197 million 
per year is needed to improve bus services across metropolitan Melbourne. 
Coordinating Public Transport, 2014 
This audit examined how well Public Transport Victoria (PTV) is managing the 
coordination of trams, trains and buses, and specifically how its activities and existing 
contractual arrangements support the achievement of seamless travel within and 
between different modes.  
The audit found that many of Melbourne’s bus routes currently have long wait times, 
indirect routes and do not operate on schedules designed to harmonise well with the 
rail network or other bus routes. This reduces their usefulness for commuters and 
impedes patronage growth.  
The audit also highlighted that the limitations with the tracking technology used on 
most buses mean that PTV is highly reliant on self-reporting by operators for 
determining penalties and other incentive payments. The absence of robust 
performance information and heavy reliance on self-reporting by bus operators means 
it is not possible to reliably use financial incentives to improve bus services. 
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1.2 Melbourne Metropolitan Bus Franchise 
The MMBF consists of: 
• 41 routes servicing the eastern suburbs and Melbourne CBD, plus approximately 
107 school special services  
• nine routes servicing the western suburbs, south eastern suburbs and the 
Melbourne CBD, plus approximately 15 school special services 
• three SmartBus orbital services, which are premium cross-town bus services 
linking radial train lines and key activity areas in Melbourne’s middle and outer 
suburbs.  
1.2.1 Key features and benefits 
A key feature of the MMBF is the performance-based incentives included in the 
franchise agreement, similar to those used for tram and train services. The MMBF 
contract incorporates financial incentives and penalties linked to key performance 
targets, designed to improve services and patronage performance.  
The expected benefits of the MMBF agreement include: 
• improved public transport coordination through timetable changes 
• timetable and route changes to better meet customer needs 
• enabling the MMBF network to evolve with community demands 
• improved communication with customers. 
These benefits were expected to be realised in two stages: 
• Between the commencement of the contract in August 2013 and April 2015, the 
new operator was expected to develop an understanding of the MMBF business 
and customers, and to develop changes intended to improve the business model 
and customer experience.  
• From April 2015 more significant changes are expected when the operator's 
rebuilt timetable takes effect. This is expected to result in improvements in 
punctuality, patronage, and coordination with other public transport modes. 
1.2.2 Reform agenda 
In approving the open tender for the MMBF in September 2011, the then government 
also approved a reform agenda and determined that it would consider MMBF as 
having achieved value if it: 
• reduced costs for the state 
• delivered improved services for more customers 
• progressed reform of the bus industry. 
Figure 1D summarises the main priorities of the reform agenda. 
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  Figure 1D
Key reform agenda priorities 
Establishing incentive-based contracts to improve coordination of the public 
transport network and promote continuous service improvement through incentive and 
penalty regimes. 
Increasing value for money through the introduction of restructured contracts, which 
are more aligned with train and tram contracts, to drive improved service delivery and 
customer experience. 
Driving innovation through the procurement process by encouraging operators to 
submit proposals focused on improving services—including timetabling, routes, safety, 
staff training and the customer experience.  
Improving risk sharing by introducing clearer incentives to grow patronage, innovate 
and share the risk of depot development and management. 
Including step-in rights and end of term provisions in new contracts in the event of 
operator non-performance to provide clarity on the arrangements for procuring and 
transferring assets at the end of the contract term. 
Increasing transparency by collecting financial and operational information to allow 
the state to better understand where productivity gains can be made, and to monitor 
the sustainability of the contracts.  
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office. 
These reform priorities were reflected in the MMBF agreement, making it 
fundamentally different to any other contracting arrangement within Melbourne’s bus 
network. It contains a suite of incentives and penalties designed around performance 
targets—including reliability, punctuality, patronage growth and customer satisfaction. 
It also gives the operator flexibility to design and propose route changes in 
collaboration with PTV, and requires the operator to review all routes and do a total 
rebuild of the current bus timetable—known as a Greenfields timetable—in 2015. 
These reforms are intended to establish an environment for wider reforms when the 
contracts for the remaining 70 per cent of services expire in 2018. 
1.2.3 Objectives and outcome of the tender 
The MMBF agreement was awarded through a competitive open tender process, 
referred to as the Metropolitan Bus Services Project (MBSP). This process was 
expected to reduce the cost to the state and increase competition in Melbourne's bus 
market. 
The MBSP had the following objectives: 
• to encourage sustainable competition in the provision of services 
• to establish new contracts that: 
• provide safe, integrated, accessible and reliable services 
• support the efficient operation of passenger transport services 
• promote innovation in the delivery of services  
• provide value for money.  
The open tender process for the MMBF was approved in September 2011 and on 
26 April 2013 the government announced the chosen operator.  
Background 
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The MMBF agreement became operational in August 2013. It is worth approximately 
$1.718 billion in nominal terms over 10 years and comprises 50 bus routes, 100 school 
special routes, 504 buses and around 1 000 drivers operating from seven depots 
across Melbourne.  
1.3 Roles and responsibilities 
Public Transport Victoria 
PTV became operational in April 2012. Its primary objective is to plan, coordinate, 
provide, operate and maintain a safe, punctual, reliable and clean public transport 
system. PTV's core functions include managing ongoing network improvements, 
planning for future public transport needs and ensuring public funds are spent 
prudently and efficiently.  
PTV oversees public transport operators who are responsible for the day-to-day 
operation of services and, subject to PTV's specifications, for improving scheduling to 
support better connectivity between transport modes. 
PTV is responsible for planning, tendering, negotiating and managing all bus service 
contracts. While PTV was responsible for managing the MMBF procurement process, 
initial planning occurred prior to its creation, and was the former Department of 
Transport’s responsibility.  
The Department of Economic Development, Jobs, Transport and 
Resources  
The MBSP was initiated by the former Department of Transport in April 2009, now 
incorporated within the Transport Division of the Department of Economic 
Development, Job, Transport and Resources (DEDJTR). However, when PTV became 
operational in April 2012, most of the staff in the public transport division transferred to 
PTV along with responsibility for MBSP.  
DEDJTR is currently part of a bus services reform joint working group with PTV. This 
group is responsible for formulating plans on the future of bus services, contractual 
and legislative issues, options for dealing with expiring contracts, and any other 
elements of reform. 
The Department of Treasury and Finance 
The MMBF was designated a complex procurement and was therefore subject to 
additional oversight from the Department of Treasury and Finance (DTF) and the 
Treasurer under the High Value High Risk framework. DTF worked with PTV in trying 
to achieve value for money procurement outcomes at both the working group and 
steering committee level.  
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1.4 Audit objectives and scope 
This audit examined whether the state has effectively secured value for money from 
the new MMBF arrangements by assessing whether: 
• the project to establish the MMBF was based on sound planning and was 
conducted in accordance with purchasing, probity and ethical conduct 
requirements and guidelines 
• management of the franchise agreement is delivering value for money and 
improved performance. 
The audit also examined whether appropriate planning to optimise value for money in 
future metropolitan bus contracts is underway, including progress on implementing the 
lessons learned from the MMBF procurement. 
The audit includes PTV, DEDJTR and DTF due to their involvement in the MMBF 
procurement process and future bus contract planning. 
1.5 Audit method and cost 
The audit involved: 
• desktop research 
• consultation with agencies and stakeholders 
• qualitative evaluation against best practice principles. 
The audit was performed in accordance with the Australian Auditing and Assurance 
Standards. Pursuant to section 20(3) of the Audit Act 1994, unless otherwise indicated, 
any persons named in this report are not the subject of adverse comment or opinion. 
The total cost of the audit was $475 000. 
1.6 Structure of the report 
The report is structured in the following parts: 
• Part 2 discusses the performance of the MMBF 
• Part 3 discusses the tendering process 
• Part 4 discusses the adequacy of contract management of the agreement. 
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2  Performance of the MMBF 
At a glance 
Background  
The Melbourne Metropolitan Bus Franchise (MMBF) is intended to improve services, 
reduce costs and progress reform of the bus industry. This Part of the report examines 
the MMBF's progress in achieving these outcomes.  
Conclusion 
Public Transport Victoria (PTV) cannot yet reliably demonstrate that MMBF is 
achieving full value for money for the state due to shortcomings with performance data. 
Unless PTV promptly addresses these deficiencies, MMBF's full benefits are unlikely to 
be achieved. 
Findings  
• In 2013–14, the cost of MMBF services was almost $33 million less than the 
previous year under the old arrangements. 
• PTV's failure to resolve longstanding data issues has meant that the performance 
regime could not be effectively implemented by April 2015 as intended. 
• PTV has begun work to reach agreement with the operator on a proposal to 
address these data issues, but it has yet to be satisfactorily resolved. 
• Any further delays to planning or project approval for future bus service 
procurements risks compromising wider bus industry reform. 
Recommendations 
• That Public Transport Victoria rectifies barriers to implementing the MMBF 
performance regime, promptly addresses offer commitment time line slippages, 
and documents and assesses the rationale for all decisions to waive the 
withholding of payments. 
• That Public Transport Victoria and the Department of Economic Development, 
Jobs, Transport and Resources advise government on all key risks, options and 
required actions for reforming the metropolitan bus contracts expiring in 2018. 
Performance of the MMBF 
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2.1 Introduction 
The state used an open tender procurement method to establish the new Melbourne 
Metropolitan Bus Franchise (MMBF) because it expected that this would result in a 
better service to customers at a reduced cost to the state. 
It also sought to use the MMBF to test the savings achievable through increased 
competition and the potential benefits of an enhanced performance-based contract as 
a precursor to extending these reforms to the rest of Melbourne's metropolitan bus 
industry. 
The state expected the MMBF would achieve value if it: 
• reduced costs for the state 
• delivered improved services for more customers 
• progressed reform of the bus industry. 
This Part of the report examines whether the MMBF is on track to achieve improved 
value for money for the state.  
2.2 Conclusion 
Although the MMBF has been operating for over 18 months, it cannot yet be 
determined with any certainty whether it is achieving full value for money for the state.  
The MMBF has proven less expensive than previous arrangements by reducing the 
cost to the state in 2013–14 by almost $33 million. However, as it also sought to 
improve services for more customers and progress reform of the bus industry, this 
metric alone is not sufficient for demonstrating value for money.  
Public Transport Victoria (PTV) failed to establish reliable performance data by 
April 2015 when the performance regime was due to be fully implemented. This means 
that the performance regime could not be effectively applied as originally intended to 
manage the contractor’s performance. While full implementation of the regime has 
since been delayed pending approval of the Greenfields timetable refresh, PTV needs 
to urgently address these issues as they are compromising its capacity to reliably 
manage the contractor's performance, including achievement of the state's reform 
agenda. 
PTV's rationale for waiving the withholding of some operator payments for delays in 
delivering required service improvements is also at odds with the MMBF's reform 
goals, and is a missed opportunity to enforce the principles of the contract and 
leverage better value for the state.  
Substantive action is still required to establish the preferred procurement method for 
the remaining metropolitan bus contracts that expire in 2018. Consequently, there is a 
significant risk that the state will miss the opportunity to significantly progress reform of 
the bus industry and achieve better value for money. 
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2.3 Reduced costs for the state 
The actual cost of MMBF services is less than under the previous procurement 
arrangements, and is in accordance with the tender price and advice provided to the 
state by PTV following tender evaluation.  
As shown in Figure 2A, MMBF expenditure for 2013–14 was almost $33 million, or 
18 per cent, less than the amount PTV estimated it would have spent if the previous 
contracts had continued. 
  Figure 2A
2013–14 actual MMBF expenditure compared to  
tender estimate and previous contracts 
 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office based on PTV financial reports. 
The MMBF cost savings have been consistent with PTV's estimates, and are expected 
to total approximately $380 million over the 10-year life of the agreement. These 
savings are attributable to efficiencies achieved by merging five contracts into one, as 
well as the new operator's proposed innovations and willingness to accept a greater 
share of the risk for poor service delivery. 
However, MMBF cost savings alone are not sufficient for assessing its achievement of 
value for money. As noted in Part 1 of this report, the state determined in 2011 that 
MMBF will have achieved value for money if it: 
• reduced costs for the state 
• delivered improved services for more customers 
• progressed reform of the bus industry. 
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2.4 Improved services for more passengers 
A key goal of the state's reform agenda in establishing the MMBF incentive-based 
contract was to provide the state with the means to continuously improve and grow bus 
services through clearly defined performance standards and monitoring arrangements.  
In this context, the MMBF contract established key obligations for the operator to:  
• continuously improve bus punctuality, reliability, safety and customer services—
including the provision of information to passengers 
• increase bus passenger numbers 
• identify opportunities to improve existing bus services—including improving 
connections between buses and other public transport modes. 
The MMBF contract contains an incentive and penalty regime to support the 
achievement of these obligations. Effective monitoring by PTV of the operator's 
performance, including enforcing penalties when necessary, is therefore critical for 
assuring these obligations are met, and for realising the contract's potential to deliver 
better services.  
Although the performance mechanisms are soundly based, they are impacted by 
longstanding data reliability issues, and delays in achieving full implementation. These 
issues risk compromising achievement of value for money from the contract, and 
PTV's capacity to effectively manage the contractor. 
PTV failed to resolve longstanding data reliability issues by April 2015, when they were 
originally due to be fully implemented under the contract. It also failed to reach a timely 
agreement with the operator on the standard for determining incentive payments for 
improvements in bus patronage—in effect delaying the operation of this regime by 
12 months. 
PTV advised towards the end of this audit that implementation of the performance 
regime and related Greenfields timetable has since been delayed, and that it has 
begun work to reach agreement with the operator on a proposal to address these data 
issues. 
It will be critical for PTV to effectively resolve these issues as they are compromising 
achievement of the state's reform agenda—including PTV's capacity to reliably assess 
and manage the contractor's performance. 
2.4.1 Performance regime 
The MMBF performance regime comprises the Patronage Incentive Regime (PIR), 
Operational Performance Regime (OPR) and Reliability Regime (RR), and uses 
financial incentives and penalties attached to service targets. 
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The regime is intended to encourage the operator to improve performance and 
increase passenger numbers. The performance regime supports achievement of the 
state's reform agenda by: 
• providing financial incentives for improved performance 
• encouraging innovative ways to improve services 
• shifting some of the financial risk for poor service to the operator. 
However, PTV failed to resolve longstanding data reliability issues by April 2015, which 
meant that the OPR was not able to be implemented as planned. It also failed to reach 
a timely agreement with the operator on the standard for determining incentive 
payments for improvements in bus patronage—in effect delaying the operation of this 
regime by 12 months. 
PTV recently advised that full implementation of the OPR has since been delayed as 
the state has yet to approve the Greenfields timetable refresh proposed by the 
contractor. 
As a result, a key aspect of the MMBF agreement remains inoperative, which 
compromises the achievement of the reform objectives—including value for money.  
Patronage Incentive Regime 
The PIR is intended to provide the operator with a financial incentive to introduce 
service improvements and other innovations that lead to increased passenger 
numbers above a benchmark agreed with PTV. Conversely, poor services leading to a 
decrease in passengers results in a financial penalty.  
The MMBF contract and PIR measure patronage by myki touch-ons. However, due to 
concerns with the reliability of myki data, and protracted negotiations with the operator 
over setting the PIR benchmark, it was not operational until February 2015—more than 
12 months after it was due to be implemented under the contract. This issue is 
examined further in Part 4 of this report.  
PTV resolved the myki data issue in July 2014. However, agreement with the operator 
was not reached until January 2015. The failure to reach a timely agreement on the 
passenger benchmark is unsatisfactory. While it is clear that passenger numbers have 
been increasing, the absence of an agreed benchmark meant PTV could not be certain 
that the operator was meeting its expectations during this period. Similarly, the 
operator did not necessarily know if more work was needed to further increase 
passenger numbers. 
Operational Performance Regime 
An MMBF service is considered punctual if it is observed at the specified service 
monitoring location, and had arrived there no more than 4:59 minutes late and 
departed no more than 59 seconds early.  
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PTV set an interim OPR punctuality benchmark of 70 per cent for all services at the 
start of MMBF operations, based on its estimate of the previous operators' 
performance. It proposes to set the permanent benchmark at 90 per cent when the 
new Greenfields timetable commences—at which point the OPR's financial penalties 
will start to be applied. The OPR penalises the operator by up to $2 million annually if it 
fails to meet its punctuality benchmark. It also provides for PTV to terminate the 
contract if punctuality drops below 75 per cent for a year without due cause. However, 
reliable bus punctuality data is not yet available—impeding the operation of the OPR. 
The contract initially required the Greenfields timetable to be implemented by 
April 2015, but this has been delayed. As noted earlier, PTV is currently working with 
the contractor to resolve reliability issues with the data. 
Reliability Regime 
Reliability is the number of service kilometres scheduled compared to the number of 
service kilometres actually travelled, expressed as a percentage. The RR came into 
force at the commencement of the contract. 
If reliability falls below 95 per cent for a quarter, or below 99 per cent for three quarters 
within a 24-month period, PTV can immediately terminate the contract. Reliability 
below 98 per cent in a quarter, or below 99 per cent for three quarters in 24 months, 
triggers a noncompliance event, compelling the operator to commit to remedial action.  
However, data concerning bus reliability has been problematic. 
Absence of reliable performance data 
The effective operation of the performance regime depends on the availability of 
accurate and reliable data.  
The MMBF agreement's OPR and RR were designed to use data gathered by PTV's 
bus tracking system (BTS). While PTV knew there were issues with the reliability of the 
BTS in June 2011 when it was developing the OPR and RR, it assumed that these 
issues would be overcome by March 2012, prior to the OPR and RR becoming 
operational. However, this did not occur and PTV's progress in addressing this issue 
has been unsatisfactory.  
Our 2014 audit Coordinating Public Transport noted that PTV advised that it expected 
the new BTS to be fully operational by July 2014, however, this has yet to occur. 
The BTS data issues stem from the number of services being monitored. The OPR 
and RR require 100 per cent of MMBF services to be monitored by the BTS. However, 
PTV now recognises that no technology solution is capable of 100 per cent 
functionality as there will always be periods, however brief, where hardware breaks 
down or software fails. 
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PTV has improved the monitoring of services throughout the MMBF contract from 
89 per cent in 2014, to the current level of 93 per cent. While this is encouraging, the 
unmonitored services affect the bus reliability calculation required under the contract 
as these services are recorded as missed service kilometres, even if the service ran as 
scheduled. Punctuality is similarly affected as a bus is considered not punctual if it is 
not observed at a contract monitoring point, even if this is due to a BTS malfunction. 
PTV documents supplied in March 2015 acknowledge that while this improvement in 
coverage better supports operational and service planning activities, it is not sufficient 
for assessing the punctuality of services as required by the contract. 
PTV has proposed an alternative method to calculate service reliability and punctuality 
to the contractor, but this had not yet been implemented at the time of audit. PTV 
recognises that overcoming this issue is critical because it will otherwise not be able to 
implement the financial incentives and penalties that are due to begin after the 
Greenfields timetable refresh. PTV could not demonstrate that it was on track to 
address this issue by April 2015 when the Greenfields timetable refresh was initially 
due to occur. 
Furthermore, we found that PTV's proposed alternative method for calculating 
reliability and punctuality is currently deficient as it relies heavily on self-reporting by 
the operator for determining reliability. PTV did not have a plan or procedures in place 
to audit and verify the accuracy of this information. 
Urgent action is required by PTV to address this issue as it risks compromising the 
integrity of the performance regime and of related incentive payments. 
PTV is also aware of a reliability issue with its myki touch-on data. At times myki 
machines can temporarily stop functioning—preventing bus passengers from 
touching on. While the system flags when a myki machine stops operating and for how 
long, PTV has no practical way of assessing the number of passenger boardings that 
are not recorded. However, PTV believes the completeness and accuracy of touch-on 
data is not materially affected. 
2.4.2 Offer commitments 
The MMBF requires the operator to deliver 21 service improvement projects—
described as offer commitments—by time lines the operator committed to in its tender 
response. If the operator fails to deliver a project on time PTV can withhold payments 
until a satisfactory remedy has been implemented or remedial plans have been agreed 
to.  
PTV has not exercised its contractual powers in relation to the operator's failure to 
deliver some projects as committed. This risks diminishing the effectiveness of the 
offer commitments performance incentive mechanism.  
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Projects not completed by due date 
Four offer commitment projects have not been completed by the time frames originally 
agreed by the operator. Three projects had their due dates extended, as the operator 
was not able to complete these projects on time. Had PTV not chosen to extend the 
deadlines, it would have been able to withhold more than $200 000 of contract 
payments and require the operator to remedy the underperformance. 
Additionally, PTV did not take any action for the operator's failure to deliver on its bus 
refurbishment offer commitment. At the end of the first contract year, PTV could have 
withheld up to $180 000 for buses that had not been refurbished. 
PTV advised that it has only agreed to extend some contract time lines for initiatives 
offered by the contractor and now formalised in the contract, but which have no impact 
on core services to customers. PTV also wanted to build a business relationship with 
the operator. 
While PTV has the discretion to withhold payments in response to these 
circumstances, it has never done so. This approach does not provide appropriate 
incentives for the operator to comply with its contractual obligations, and risks 
compromising achievement of the state's reform goals. 
Delivery of key improvement projects 
Three key offer commitment projects require the operator to reduce fare evasion, 
develop and implement a new bus timetable known as Greenfields, and increase 
customer satisfaction. As these projects directly relate to the reform agenda, they are 
important for assessing whether the state is getting better value for money from the 
MMBF. 
Fare evasion 
The fare evasion project requires the operator to reduce the fare evasion rate on its 
services to 5 per cent by 1 August 2015 and then to 2.3 per cent by 30 June 2021. By 
May 2014, the fare evasion rate had risen to 13.1 per cent from 10.1 per cent in 
October 2013. In October 2014 the rate was 8 per cent indicating that reaching the 
target rate will be challenging for the operator.  
While it is evident that the operator has taken a range of remedial actions, failure to 
achieve this result would entitle PTV to formally notify the operator that its 
noncompliance with the MMBF risks termination of its contract, or withholding of 
contract payments until a satisfactory remedy has been implemented.  
In August 2014, the operator raised concerns that the methodology of the survey that 
PTV uses to calculate the level of fare evasion was not representative of the areas it 
operated. Although PTV subsequently reviewed and made some minor adjustments to 
the survey, it is unclear if these have been accepted by the operator.  
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Greenfields timetable 
A total rebuild of the current bus timetable, known as the Greenfields timetable, is 
another key offer commitment. By having the operator develop and propose a rebuilt 
timetable, PTV aims to improve the efficiency of these bus services and increase 
patronage at no additional cost to the state. Implementation of the Greenfields 
timetable was scheduled for April 2015. However, this has now been delayed, as the 
state has not yet given its approval to proceed. 
The initial step toward Greenfields implementation was the July 2014 timetable refresh. 
The operator implemented a suite of service changes, including route changes, route 
cancellations and timetable changes. The timetable refresh was not as extensive as 
the full Greenfields implementation will be, but was still a much more significant 
change than bus patrons are accustomed to. These changes met with passenger 
resistance and criticism of the consultation processes—following passenger 
complaints and highly critical media coverage over the cancellation of one bus route, 
the then Minister for Public Transport intervened to reinstate this service. 
The operator subsequently acknowledged that improved communication to passengers 
about the changes needed to occur, such as providing more information at bus stops, 
more media releases and earlier availability of printed timetables. The operator 
submitted its draft business case for the Greenfields timetable on time. However, as 
this was before the full impact of the July 2014 refresh was known, it did not take into 
account the concerns raised by customers. PTV advised that the draft was 
subsequently finalised after considering passenger feedback on the July 2014 service 
changes and proposed Greenfields timetable. 
PTV further advised during the audit that, while it is not possible to achieve 
100 per cent acceptance by the public of proposed service changes, it was confident 
the operator would implement the Greenfields timetable in April 2015 as originally 
intended by the contract. However, the state has since delayed its implementation. 
Failure to implement it successfully, and learn from past experiences, will have 
negative consequences in terms of service improvement.  
Customer satisfaction  
The operator is required to improve its overall customer satisfaction rating to 
80 per cent or more by 31 December 2016. If this result is not achieved, the operator 
will be required to implement remedial plans to address the factors negatively 
impacting on the rating.  
Although PTV reviews the results of quarterly customer satisfaction surveys and 
discusses the results with the operator, it does not complement this work with specified 
interim targets to more rigorously track the operator’s progress towards meeting the 
target.  
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2.4.3 Service specifications 
Service specifications are performance standards set by the MMBF agreement that 
include: 
• general obligations covering the quality of service provision 
• ensuring staff are properly trained and experienced, and that drivers are 
appropriately authorised 
• maintaining sufficient numbers of buses to meet operational requirements 
• ensuring bus depots and other bus-related infrastructure meets all legislative 
requirements. 
PTV has not defined the qualitative elements of the general obligations. For example, 
the operator is required to perform its obligations in a 'timely and expeditious way' and 
in a 'proper, competent, courteous, safe and reliable manner' but these standards are 
not defined. Nor does PTV undertake any form of monitoring of the operator's 
compliance with the service specifications, preferring to address issues as they arise. 
As such, PTV is not as well placed to identify and respond to any noncompliance or to 
challenge the operator where PTV believes its standards have not been met.  
2.5 Progressive reform of the bus industry 
The MMBF was intended to form the basis for further reform of the Victorian bus 
industry. In this regard, the next round of procurements will be for the remaining 
70 per cent of metropolitan services that are currently provided through 27 private 
contracts that expire in July 2018.  
PTV and the Department of Economic Development, Jobs, Transport and Resources' 
(DEDJTR) slow progress in determining the preferred procurement option and tight 
project time frame for establishing follow-on contracts risks the state not achieving 
further bus industry reform and improving value for money. 
2.5.1 Procurement risks 
Establishing new contracts to replace the 27 that expire in July 2018 will be a complex 
and time-consuming project. The number and severity of risks facing this project will 
depend on how much further the state elects to pursue its reform agenda. 
Absence of clear end-of-term rights 
Throughout the 1990s, successive reports by the then Industry Commission, the 
Victorian Commission of Audit and VAGO all noted that the practice of establishing 
contracts through negotiation with incumbent operators, without exposing them to 
competition, minimises the state's ability to gain best value for money. Moreover, the 
Victorian Government Purchasing Board's guidelines are based on the presumption 
that all major procurements will be open for tender to ensure the market is fully tested, 
and that all qualified providers can compete for government work. 
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The 27 private contracts do not contain any clear end-of-term rights for the state or an 
explicit right to offer the services through tender. However, the bus operators claim 
their financial investment in establishing the services gives them proprietary rights over 
their routes, and deny the state has the right to offer their routes to tender. The state 
does not share this view, but has not yet tested its position.  
Consequently, pursuing an open tender could lead to the current operators taking legal 
action against the state, thereby potentially delaying any tender process until a 
settlement is reached or a legal ruling is obtained. 
Negotiating contractual reforms 
If the state elects to establish new contracts through negotiation with incumbent 
operators, it is unlikely to be able to pursue contractual reforms as extensive as those 
sought during the MMBF's procurement.  
When contracts were negotiated in 2008 the incumbent operators were resistant to 
major reforms, including open book access to their financial data, establishing 
end-of-term rights and asset rights. Our 2009 audit of this process, Melbourne's New 
Bus Contracts, found that only modest cost reductions were achieved, and that on a 
like-for-like basis, the costs of the contracts negotiated in 2008 were very close to the 
costs of those they replaced. 
2.5.2 Timeliness of planning 
As the state faces risks no matter which procurement option is chosen, early advice to 
government is critical to ensure that all risks are appropriately assessed during the 
decision-making process.  
Our 2009 audit recommended the former Department of Transport provide early advice 
to government on the strategic options and constraints for future metropolitan bus 
contracts. While the department and PTV implemented this recommendation for 
MMBF, it has not been addressed in relation to the next tranche of bus contracts. 
The project to establish the MMBF required multiple approaches to government over 
14 months before the decision to proceed with the open tender was reached. A further 
22 months elapsed before the MMBF commenced operating. 
Achieving further bus industry reform through new contracts will be much more 
complex, high risk and time intensive, and consequently will be likely to require more 
than a three-year lead time. PTV and DEDJTR established a joint working group in 
July 2014 to commence preliminary planning for the next round of bus contact 
procurements. The working group commissioned initial research on bus structures in 
other jurisdictions and potential options for reform. An interdepartmental steering 
committee comprising PTV, DEDJTR, the Department of Treasury and Finance and the 
Department of Premier and Cabinet was also formed in early 2015 to inform the 
development of a related procurement strategy for the government's consideration by 
August 2015.  
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However, progress on this initiative has been slow, meaning the remaining time for 
planning and implementing this project is ambitious and not commensurate with the 
significant scale and complexity of the task. 
This situation risks limiting the state's options in 2018—if delays result in insufficient 
time to pursue an open tender, negotiating with incumbent operators may be left as the 
only way to proceed. Such an outcome will likely compromise any opportunity for the 
state to achieve improved value for money from these bus contracts. 
Recommendations 
That Public Transport Victoria: 
1. promptly rectifies all barriers to implementing the Melbourne Metropolitan Bus 
Franchise performance regime, including data reliability issues  
2. documents and assesses the rationale for all decisions to waive the withholding 
of payments for non-performance  
3. closely monitors the delivery of key offer commitments and proactively addresses 
any slippage from contractual time lines 
4. systematically audits and verifies the reliability of performance data provided by 
the operator underpinning incentive payments. 
That Public Transport Victoria and the Department of Economic Development, Jobs, 
Transport and Resources: 
5. advise government on all key risks, options and required actions for reforming the 
metropolitan bus contracts expiring in 2018. 
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3  Tendering the MMBF 
At a glance 
Background  
The Melbourne Metropolitan Bus Franchise (MMBF) was established using a 
competitive tender process. This Part of the report examines the planning and conduct 
of the MMBF tender. 
Conclusion 
The former Department of Transport's strategic planning was clearly focused on 
producing a value-for-money outcome, but did not fully comply with the required 
policies and guidance. Public Transport Victoria's (PTV) competitive tender process 
was guided by the appropriate procurement principles and resulted in a contract that is 
capable of delivering value for money. 
Findings  
• The former Department of Transport did not prepare a business case for the 
MMBF or finalise a strategic procurement plan. 
• Despite this, value for money was considered from the start of strategic planning, 
and directly informed the development of the MMBF tender and contract. 
• The tender evaluation process was well managed and focused on achieving 
value for money for the state. 
• PTV managed most probity requirements effectively, however, the independence 
of the probity auditor at times was at risk of being compromised. 
Recommendations 
• That the Department of Economic Development, Jobs, Transport and Resources 
and Public Transport Victoria develop a business case for future bus service 
procurement  
• That Public Transport Victoria and the Department of Treasury and Finance use 
the lessons from the targeted improvement process and develop guidance. 
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3.1 Introduction 
The state chose an open tender process to establish the Melbourne Metropolitan Bus 
Franchise (MMBF) to advance reform of Melbourne's bus industry, and to maximise 
value by increasing competition in the Victorian bus market. 
The former Department of Transport (DOT) managed the strategic planning and most 
of the tender planning, until Public Transport Victoria (PTV) became operational in 
April 2012. DOT personnel involved in tender planning were transferred to PTV, which 
assumed responsibility for the remaining tender planning and the tender conduct. The 
Department of Treasury and Finance (DTF) was also directly involved throughout the 
planning and procurement stages, with representatives sitting on the project and 
tender steering committees, as well as the tender evaluation panel.  
PTV employed a two stage approach to market, involving an expression of interest 
(EOI) followed by a request for tender (RFT) issued to shortlisted applicants. The 
MMBF's value and its significance to the state as a critical element of Melbourne's 
public transport network led the state to apply additional scrutiny to the tender under 
the High Value High Risk (HVHR) process. PTV also committed to complying with 
Victorian Government Purchasing Board (VGPB) requirements to ensure the tender 
was run in accordance with better practice.  
Figure 3A provides an overview of the MMBF procurement process.  
  Figure 3A
The MMBF procurement process  
Stage Description 
Preliminary approval In July 2010, the government endorsed using an open tender to 
establish new contracts for the Orbital SmartBus services, and 
services run by the National Bus Company (NBC) and 
Melbourne Bus Link (MBL). Endorsement was subject to 
additional pre-procurement work. 
Approval of project On 22 September 2011, the government approved the joint 
tender of the NBC, MBL and Orbital SmartBus services. The 
project was intended to improve the state’s contracting of bus 
services by delivering reform and was also formally brought 
under the HVHR framework. 
Expression of interest  Expression of interest documents were issued to the market on 
6 June 2012 following the Treasurer’s approval. Responses 
closed on 19 July 2012 and were evaluated by PTV in 
conjunction with DTF. 
Request for tender Request for tender documents were issued to five shortlisted 
bidders following the Treasurer’s approval on 29 October 2012. 
However, two of the shortlisted bidders subsequently withdrew, 
and three submitted a proposal. Responses closed on 
31 January 2013 and were evaluated by PTV in conjunction 
with DTF. 
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Figure 3A 
The MMBF procurement process – continued 
Stage Description 
Targeted improvement 
process 
The evaluation panel recommended this process to seek 
adjustments in specific areas of risk allocation and cost. The 
process was undertaken with all three bidders. It was approved 
by the project steering committee on 14 March 2013 and issued 
to each bidder on 19 March 2013. 
Improved bids were received on 5 April 2013 and re-evaluated. 
The ranking of the bids did not change, however, the risks to 
the state and the cost of all proposals were reduced. 
Tender award 
endorsement 
The project steering committee endorsed the evaluation panel 
recommendation to award the tender to the preferred bidder on 
22 April 2013. The Minister for Public Transport also approved 
the preferred tender decision on 22 April 2013. 
Treasurer approval On 24 April 2013 the Treasurer approved the preferred bidder. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office. 
3.2 Conclusion 
Strategic planning for the MMBF tender was clearly focused on producing a 
value-for-money outcome, but did not fully comply with the required VGPB policies and 
guidance. Despite this, our assessment of supporting documentation indicates that the 
key costs, benefits, risks and options were adequately identified and considered. 
The competitive tender process was guided by the appropriate procurement principles 
and probity requirements, and resulted in a contract that is capable of delivering value 
for money. 
While the targeted improvement process (TIP) introduced at the end of the RFT 
assessment was not planned for, it contributed to achieving a value-for-money 
outcome for the state.  
3.3 Strategic planning for the procurement 
VGPB sets policies and minimum standards for departments’ procurement of 
non-construction goods and services. These cover procurement planning, conduct, 
awarding of contracts, and contract management.  
VGPB has recently moved to more principles-based policies under the procurement 
reform process. However, the MMBF procurement was planned and implemented 
between 2010 and 2013 and was subject to the more prescriptive VGPB policy 
requirements in place at that time.  
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3.3.1 Approach to government and procurement options 
DTF has provided advice to successive governments since the 1990s on the need to 
seek competitive reform of the bus industry to deliver better services for commuters 
and better value for money for the state. Its advice to the Treasurer and government 
during 2011 clearly demonstrated the case for competitively tendering the MMBF 
procurement. This advice also outlined the strategic advantages of tendering these bus 
services to support longer-term reform—including plans for the future tendering of the 
remaining 70 per cent of metropolitan bus services. 
DTF and the former DOT considered a range of procurement options, including direct 
negotiation with incumbent operators, and tendering the services provided by NBC, 
MBL and SmartBus as individual packages. In March 2011 these options were 
presented to government, along with a recommendation to proceed with an open 
tender. The government did not initially accept this recommendation and instead 
sought additional advice on the merits of negotiating with the incumbent operators.  
In September 2011, after considering additional advice from DTF and the former DOT, 
the government approved the use of an open tender and the application of the HVHR 
process. It also approved the reform agenda—a series of reform goals that the MMBF 
project was to pursue. Responsibility for future MMBF project approvals was also 
delegated to the Treasurer and Minister for Public Transport. This decision marked the 
end of strategic planning and the start of project development. 
3.3.2 Developing a business case 
The former DOT did not develop a business case or a final strategic procurement plan 
(SPP) for the MMBF. VGPB policy in place at the time required an SPP for 
procurements over $10 million, and for high risk or complex acquisitions regardless of 
value.  
The SPP is intended to detail how the project will meet the identified business needs, 
and is supported by a business case. The business case should contain all the 
information needed to decide whether to support a proposed procurement activity, 
including the costs and benefits of the project, the proposed procurement method and 
conduct, and how the project intends to achieve the best value for money. 
Our 2009 audit, Melbourne's New Bus Contracts, stated that for new major bus 
procurements the former DOT should use VGPB guidance to develop a business case 
as part of the SPP, because the business case format is a clear and disciplined way to 
compare the costs, benefits and risks of the procurement options.  
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This departure from VGPB requirements created a risk that government decisions on 
the procurement project were not based on comprehensive advice. However, our 
assessment of MMBF-related Cabinet and ministerial submissions indicates that key 
costs, benefits, risks and options were properly identified and considered. In particular, 
the final approved submission to Cabinet in September 2011 contained the critical 
elements of an SPP, including a description of how the procurement meets the 
business need, procurement options for achieving the desired outcomes, details of 
stakeholders and departmental resources, and risk management issues. 
This informed the development of the EOI and RFT documentation.  
3.4 Procurement planning 
Between project approval and the release of the EOI in June 2012, the former DOT, 
DTF and PTV continued planning the practical conduct of the tender. This was 
informed by the approved reform agenda, VGPB and HVHR policy requirements, and 
a market sounding exercise undertaken in November 2011. This culminated in the 
development of a procurement conduct plan (PCP) as an overarching framework for 
managing the tender process. 
3.4.1 Procurement conduct plan  
The PCP was approved by the steering committee in May 2012. It documented the 
governance structure, and the required procurement processes to be followed to 
achieve an impartial, transparent and accountable tender process. It provided an 
adequate framework for addressing probity risks, as it described the need to engage a 
probity auditor and clear processes for dealing with conflicts of interest and for 
ensuring the confidentiality of submitted tender information. It also documented 
communication protocols with tenderers and related information management 
requirements.  
A project management plan was also developed providing an additional reference for 
the project team on required procedures that was in accordance with the PCP.  
PTV also established a risk management framework, consisting of a risk and issues 
management plan, risk register and risk action plans in accordance with HVHR 
requirements. There is evidence to indicate that the risks were monitored by the 
project team, recorded on the risk register and were regularly reported to the steering 
committee. 
3.4.2 Market sounding 
The former DOT canvassed interest from potential bidders in a market sounding 
exercise undertaken in November 2011. Through this process DOT sought comments 
from potential tenderers on risks and issues the project team had identified and to 
gauge the level of market interest. The market sounding exercise confirmed that the 
open tender could deliver a contract that met the reform agenda objectives.  
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3.4.3 Governance  
Project governance should set a firm framework to guide project success, create 
transparency and confidence in decision-making, and provide clarity around roles and 
responsibilities. The PCP and project management plan clarified governance 
arrangements for the Metropolitan Bus Services Project (MBSP). These were 
implemented as intended, however, the independence of the probity auditor was at risk 
of being compromised at times, as the auditor also provided probity advice. This issue 
is discussed in Section 3.5.5. The governance arrangements are outlined in Figure 3B. 
  Figure 3B
MBSP governance structure 
Role Responsibilities 
Treasurer and Minister for 
Public Transport 
Overall responsibility for approval of the preferred tenderer 
and final contract. 
Project steering committee Responsible for business and resourcing issues including: 
• approval of changes to the project and its supporting 
documentation 
• monitoring and review of the project and its risks 
• assistance to the project when required 
• resolution of escalated issues and conflicts 
• formal approval of project deliverables.  
It was comprised of staff from DTF, the Department of 
Premier and Cabinet, and PTV.  
Project director Accountable to the steering committee and Chief 
Executive Officer of PTV for the delivery of the project, 
including: 
• reporting on progress 
• stakeholder management and communications 
• managing budget and scope 
• managing project activities and resources. 
Project team Responsible for preparing project documentation, 
including EOI and RFT drafting, providing supporting 
analysis and recommendations to evaluation teams/panel 
and the project steering committee. 
Probity auditor Responsible for ensuring adherence to the procurement 
conduct plan and for providing an independent 
assessment of the procurement process. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office from information provided by Public Transport Victoria. 
3.4.4 External review and approvals 
Under the HVHR framework, a project is required to undergo two Gateway reviews 
during the procurement stage. It also requires projects to obtain the Treasurer’s 
approval at key points of the process, including the issuing of EOI and RFT documents 
to the market.  
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Evidence reviewed indicates that PTV complied with the HVHR requirements and 
underwent reviews at Gate 3 and Gate 4. The gate reviews did not raise any 
substantive issues. The Treasurer approved the release of the EOI and RFT 
documentation and the preferred tenderer prior to contract award.  
3.5 Procurement conduct  
In open tender processes VGPB policy emphasises the importance of ensuring all 
bidders are treated fairly, have access to the same information, and that standards of 
probity, confidentiality and information security are applied. 
PTV had sound processes in place for the EOI and RFT phases, and the unanticipated 
TIP was adequately managed and did not compromise the tender process. The TIP is 
examined in Section 3.5.3.  
The key VGPB requirements for an open tender process and PTV's compliance with 
these is summarised in Figure 3C. 
  Figure 3C
Key VGPB procurement policy requirements 
Requirement Achieved 
Open or selective tendering is the preferred method of approaching the market 
for procurement valued in excess of $150 000 
 
Tenders must be advertised in the Herald Sun and published on the Victorian 
Government Tenders website at a minimum 
 
The open tender period should provide sufficient time for suppliers to prepare 
a tender submission. The suggested tender periods for high value high 
complexity procurements is in excess of 21 working days 
 
A procurement conduct plan should be developed to outline the standards of 
conduct for the process 
 
Tenderers must be provided with the same information  
Proposals must be assessed against the evaluation criteria specified in the 
tender documentation 
 
Information must be securely managed to maintain confidentiality  
A project director accountable for project delivery should be appointed  
There should be a process to identify and manage conflicts of interest  
A probity auditor should be engaged to provide an independent assessment of 
the procurement conduct 
Partially 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office. 
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3.5.1 Expression of interest process 
The EOI evaluation plan approved by the steering committee in May 2012 accords with 
VGPB policy. It set out the requirements for the EOI evaluation process—including 
evaluation roles and responsibilities, document control procedures, criteria and 
methodology, and reporting and debriefing requirements. The plan also documented 
arrangements for managing probity such as conflicts of interest, receipt and 
registration of responses and respondent communication. EOI documents were issued 
to the market on 6 June 2012 following the Treasurer’s approval as required under the 
HVHR process. Responses closed on 19 July 2012. 
The initial EOI evaluation panel report was prepared in August 2012 consistent with the 
requirements set out in the EOI evaluation plan. It ranked the respondents and 
documented a recommended shortlist comprising the four highest ranked submissions. 
The report included evaluation panel scores and a high-level summary of evaluation 
team findings against each of the criteria. The steering committee considered the 
report on 20 August 2012, and directed the evaluation panel to refine its assessment, 
particularly in relation to the fourth, fifth and sixth ranked submissions, as the basis of 
their ranking was unclear.  
Further analysis led to a re-ranking of the bids, which did not materially alter the 
outcome for the previously four highest ranked bids. However, this further analysis 
improved the rank of the tenderer who would later be selected as the operator from 
fifth to equal fourth. A supplementary assessment report was prepared which 
recommended shortlisting the five highest ranked responses. The steering committee 
approved the panel's recommendation on 23 August 2012.  
The RFT was released to the five shortlisted parties on 29 October 2012. Two of the 
parties withdrew from the process—due to the parties being awarded contracts in other 
jurisdictions, meaning they no longer had capacity to commit to the MMBF—resulting 
in three proposals being submitted.  
3.5.2 Request for tender process 
VGPB guidance provides that an RFT evaluation plan should be prepared and 
approved prior to the close of the tender period. While the MMBF RFT evaluation plan 
was prepared and approved by both the project director and steering committee chair, 
final approval of the plan was on 1 February 2013, one day after the RFT period 
closed. However, PTV took the appropriate steps to mitigate any probity breach in this 
instance. Project team members were not given access to submissions until after the 
evaluation plan was approved by the steering committee chair. The probity auditor also 
noted that the version of the RFT evaluation plan approved by the chair was 
unchanged from the version approved by the project director. 
The RFT evaluation plan was prepared in accordance with VGPB guidelines. However, 
the plan did not include the TIP, as it was not part of the planned evaluation process 
and was added after the evaluation commenced.  
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3.5.3 Targeted improvement process 
The TIP involved inviting shortlisted bidders to reconsider certain cost areas that PTV 
assessed were capable of improvement. In presenting the TIP to the steering 
committee, the evaluation panel outlined the following stages: 
• Stage 1: Targeted improvement—all shortlisted respondents were given 
tailored areas specific to their proposal to focus on and each given a two-week 
response period. 
• Stage 2: Clarification—focused exclusively on the highest ranked proposal and 
on ensuring the draft contract was close to being executable. 
By engaging all shortlisted bidders during this evaluation stage, the TIP maintained 
competitive tension and assisted with optimising value for money from the bids. The 
steering committee and probity auditor endorsed this approach in March 2013. 
3.5.4 Approval of preferred tenderer 
The RFT Final Evaluation Report was prepared and endorsed by the steering 
committee in April 2013. The report showed the panel’s overall rank for each 
respondent at the completion of the initial evaluation process, and after the TIP. The 
probity, legal and financial aspects of this outcome was also independently scrutinised 
and assured.  
The tender process concluded on 24 April 2013, when the Treasurer approved 
selection of the preferred bidder following endorsement of this recommendation by the 
PTV board and Minister for Public Transport.  
3.5.5 Probity 
PTV effectively managed most probity requirements for the project. Established 
procedures largely conformed to guidelines set out in the VGPB policy for the Conduct 
of Commercial Engagements. Specifically, PTV: 
• developed a PCP which adequately outlined the standards of conduct for the 
process 
• provided tenderers with the same information 
• established clear processes for identifying and managing conflicts of interest 
• engaged a probity auditor to provide an independent assessment of the 
procurement conduct.  
The tailored approach adopted with tenderers during the TIP process did not breach 
VGPB guidelines, as the information sought from individual tenderers was 
commercially sensitive.  
PTV’s PCP outlined how VGPB’s probity principles were to be applied to the 
procurement. Figure 3D outlines how PTV complied with these. 
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  Figure 3D
Application of probity standards 
Standard Complied Action 
Equal treatment 
of bidders 
 • Bidders were provided with the same information, this 
includes tender documents, addendums and 
clarification notices. However, this did not extend to the 
TIP process due to the confidential nature of 
information specific to each submission. 
• An electronic data room (EDR) was also established, 
which respondents were able to access. 
Document 
control 
procedures  
 • Procedures relating to document distribution, storage 
and communication protocols were clearly 
documented in the PCP, and evaluation plans. 
• RFT documentation was accessible through an EDR. A 
user guide for the EDR was developed. 
• Information related to the MBSP and password 
protected USBs were securely stored in locked 
compactus. Documents were also filed in secure 
folders in PTV's document management system.  
Managing 
conflicts of 
interest 
 • Conflict of interest declarations were completed by 
project team members, the evaluation panel and the 
steering committee. 
• In all instances where conflicts were declared these 
were investigated further to determine what action 
would be taken. 
• A mitigation and management strategy was prepared 
which documented a recommended action based on 
an evaluation of the conflict. 
• Probity briefings were provided and attended by the 
MBSP team.  
Independent 
probity 
assessment 
Partially • A probity auditor was engaged to assess the 
implementation of the MBSP and provide a limited 
review of the process. However the probity auditor on 
occasion also provided advice on the process, 
weakening the independence of their auditor role. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office. 
Probity auditor 
The probity auditor's terms of reference were to provide a limited or negative 
assurance review of the process. The probity auditor provided two limited assurance 
reviews covering 15 November 2010 to the end of the EOI stage, and from 
19 September 2012 to the selection of the preferred bidder. 
PTV did not separate the probity advisor and probity auditor roles. The probity auditor 
also provided probity advice including:  
• providing probity briefings to project team members  
• advice on managing conflict of interests  
• advice on probity requirements in steering committee meetings.  
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Although VGPB policy and associated guidelines allow the probity auditor and probity 
advisor roles to reside with a single entity, VAGO believes combining these roles 
weakens the perception of independence. This is consistent with our finding in VAGO’s 
2009 performance audit of Melbourne’s New Bus Contracts. 
Future bus service procurements should engage a separate probity auditor and probity 
advisor. 
Recommendations 
6. That Public Transport Victoria and the Department of Economic Development, 
Jobs, Transport and Resources develop a business case assessing the cost and 
benefits of alternative reform options and related strategies for all future bus 
service procurements in accordance with Victorian Government Purchasing 
Board guidance. 
7. That Public Transport Victoria separates the role of probity auditor and advisor on 
future procurements.  
8. That Public Transport Victoria and the Department of Treasury and Finance use 
the lessons from Melbourne Metropolitan Bus Franchise's targeted improvement 
process to develop guidance on how it may be applied more broadly in future 
procurements. 
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4  Managing the MMBF agreement 
At a glance 
Background  
This Part of the report examines the contract management processes, policies, 
systems and practices in place for the Melbourne Metropolitan Bus Franchise (MMBF). 
Conclusion 
Public Transport Victoria (PTV) is not effectively managing the MMBF agreement. 
There is no complete contract management plan to guide management and 
decision-making, which has led to the inconsistent application of contract provisions. 
Contract variations are not fully considered prior to implementation, which risks 
undermining the value of the MMBF agreement.    
Findings  
• PTV did not establish its contract management processes prior to commencing 
MMBF services.  
• PTV is inconsistently applying the MMBF contract provisions and is not enforcing 
penalties for underperformance and non-performance.   
• Contract management decision-making roles and responsibilities are not 
sufficiently documented. 
• PTV does not have effective knowledge management or document control 
processes in place for the MMBF, and relies too much on the undocumented 
knowledge of individuals.   
• PTV does not systematically verify the completion of MMBF contract tasks.   
Recommendations 
Public Transport Victoria should clarify and document knowledge management 
processes and contract management roles and responsibilities, and establish 
assurance and monitoring processes to verify contract tasks are completed. 
Managing the MMBF agreement 
 
36       Tendering of Metropolitan Bus Contracts Victorian Auditor-General’s Report 
       
 
4.1 Introduction 
Effective contract management ensures that all parties meet their obligations under the 
contract, and is necessary to secure value for money. Key elements of effective 
contract management include: 
• policies that clarify roles and responsibilities for contract management and 
decision-making 
• staff with appropriate skills who understand the objectives of the contract 
• monitoring and management of contractor performance throughout the life of the 
contract 
• consistent and professional application of contract provisions 
• ensuring that payments are made in accordance with the contract and related 
performance standards. 
Effective contract management also involves responding to changing circumstances 
and implementing contract variations as required. Contract variations should be used 
to ensure changed circumstances do not reduce the value of the contract, and that 
innovations and opportunities to increase value for money can be exploited.  
This Part of the report assesses Public Transport Victoria's (PTV) contract 
management policies, processes and systems, and whether the Melbourne 
Metropolitan Bus Franchise (MMBF) agreement is being managed effectively.  
4.2 Conclusion 
PTV did not have any contract management processes in place to track performance 
and ensure compliance with the contract terms for the first four months of MMBF 
operations. As a result, it was not in a position to ensure that the contract delivered 
value for money during this time. 
PTV's contract management policies and practices for the MMBF are inadequate, and 
risk undermining the value of the MMBF agreement. The lack of a contract 
management plan has led to inconsistency in the application of some contract terms. 
These inconsistencies and PTV's willingness to negotiate extensions on contract 
deadlines risk reducing the value of the contract, and created a precedent for the 
operator to negotiate away penalties. 
PTV has not assessed the value-for-money implications of the approved contract 
variations. This risks undermining MMBF's value, as it means there is little assurance 
that variations support the achievement of MMBF's objectives.       
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4.3 Systems, policies and processes 
Effective contract management systems, policies and processes enable a contract to 
be administered efficiently, correctly and consistently. A contract management plan is 
the primary source for this—Victorian Government Purchasing Board guidance 
highlights the need for a contract management plan for all critical and high risk 
procurements. 
PTV advised it has an organisation-wide contract management framework, and a 
quality management system certified to AS/NZS ISO 9001:2008 Quality management 
systems – requirements, which governs its approach to managing all contracts with 
operators. 
This framework is supplemented by specific policies and procedures applicable to the 
MMBF. 
4.3.1 Policies and processes 
PTV does not have a complete contract management plan in place for the MMBF. 
Contract management processes specific to the MMBF are documented in a Contract 
Administration Manual (CAM) and 17 supporting Processes Administration Guides 
(PAG). The CAM is intended to assist PTV staff to understand the obligations of the 
franchise agreement and guide them through the related workflow processes. The 
PAGs contain workflow processes for routine contract management tasks. 
The CAM and PAGs are sufficient for routine contract management and administrative 
processes, such as calculating payments. However, they were never intended to 
operate without an MMBF contract management plan. Key elements missing from the 
CAM and PAGs include: 
• Clear roles and responsibilities—the CAM lays out a general chain of 
responsibility within PTV for the contract, but does not sufficiently detail where 
responsibility lies for specific tasks and key decisions. There is no 
decision-making process for complex or contentious issues, which increases the 
risk of delays due issues being escalated unnecessarily. 
• Guidance on contract reviews and a review strategy—there is no 
documented process for conducting regular contract reviews and no related 
review strategy.  
• Requirements for data and information management, including files and 
recordkeeping—there is no documentation detailing the MMBF's information or 
knowledge management processes, policies or strategies.  
Without an MMBF-specific document covering these elements, the knowledge needed 
to effectively manage the contract is likely to be lost due to staff changes. This risk has 
materialised and is covered in Section 4.4.5. 
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While the CAM and PAGs, in concert with PTV's contract management framework, 
offer sufficient guidance for routine contract management, they are not sufficient to 
ensure that the contract is managed effectively and consistently throughout the life of 
the agreement. 
4.3.2 Contract management system   
PTV's contract management system, Affinitext, is designed to facilitate effective 
contract management by breaking down the MMBF's complex processes into simple 
tasks that are assigned to individuals. PTV advised that MMBF franchise management 
staff regularly review and update Affinitext on the status and completion of due tasks, 
which on occasions involves physical inspection. However, it is not clear that this has 
systematically occurred. 
Contract management staff advised that all tasks are usually completed, but 
acknowledged they do not systematically verify completion, or if sufficient evidence 
has been provided. 
Affinitext is routinely updated following approved contract variations. However, there 
are no established procedures for ensuring the CAM and PAGs are similarly updated. 
Consequently, there is insufficient assurance that the existing guidance material is up 
to date. This issue is examined further in Section 4.5.    
4.3.3 Establishing processes and transition 
There is no evidence that PTV had any contract management processes in place for 
the first four months of MMBF operations. This means that PTV was not in a position to 
ensure that the contract delivered value for money when services commenced, as it 
did not have the mechanisms needed to track performance and ensure compliance 
with the contract terms. 
Our 2009 audit Melbourne's New Bus Contracts recommended that for new contracts 
PTV should engage more effectively with operational staff to complete the contract 
management documentation, and to plan for the transition to the new arrangements 
before existing contracts expire. This recommendation was partially implemented for 
MMBF transition. Operational staff were involved during all stages of the tender 
assessment, contract development and transition planning—however, PTV still failed 
to finalise its contract management processes prior to the start of services.  
4.4 Contract management 
PTV is not managing the MMBF contract effectively, undermining the potential for the 
state to realise the full value possible from the agreement. Contract terms are being 
inconsistently enforced, with PTV declining to apply penalties. PTV has been entitled 
to withhold over $380 000 in payments and seek underperformance remediation plans 
and commitments, which it has declined to do.  
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4.4.1 Transition 
The transition from the five previous contracts to the MMBF contract occurred without 
any major interruption to services. However, as there were no MMBF-specific contract 
management processes in place, it is not possible to assess whether all aspects of the 
contract were being effectively managed during this time.    
A Transition Steering Group was established to manage the transition, which was 
primarily concerned with risks and issues that could impede the commencement of 
operations. The group did not consider the implications of not having a contract 
management framework in place.  
The Transition Steering Group managed the operational commencement risks well, 
ensuring mitigation or management plans were developed for significant risks, and 
requiring regular updates from those responsible for each risk. Successful 
management or mitigation strategies included: 
• shifting the service commencement date from a weekday to a Sunday, to ensure 
start-up issues affected the fewest customers 
• running several combined first day of service rehearsals with the operator and 
PTV staff. 
4.4.2 Application of contract terms 
Some of the MMBF contract terms and penalties are being applied inconsistently. PTV 
chose to extend the completion deadlines for three offer commitments—bus 
rebranding, the establishment of an operations control centre, and the installation of 
automatic passenger counters. Instead of withholding contract payments of $200 000 
and making the operator develop and implement a plan to remedy the 
underperformance—as the contract entitles PTV to do—it chose to extend the 
completion deadlines. 
A fourth offer commitment—the refurbishment of buses over 13 years old—was not 
met for the first contract year. Again, PTV had the option of withholding payment of 
$180 000 and making the operator develop and implement a plan to remedy the 
underperformance, it did not do so.  
PTV advised that it has only waived the withholding of payments for some delayed 
initiatives offered by the contractor and now formalised in the contract, but which have 
no impact on core services to customers. However, a key goal of introducing the 
performance-based MMBF contract was to create incentives for improving 
performance. While deadlines may sometimes need to be extended, the contract 
enables PTV to reasonably reduce payments in response, but it has never done so. 
PTV's practice of extending contractual deadlines rather than withholding payments is 
inconsistent with the state's reform objective of establishing an incentive-based 
contract. Contractual penalties are an important mechanism for encouraging 
improvements in performance. PTV's failure to consistently enforce them risks 
compromising the contract's value and achieving the state's reform objectives. 
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4.4.3 Data issues and relationship management 
As noted in Part 2 of this report, ongoing issues with data reliability are impeding PTV's 
capacity to measure and monitor performance and effectively manage the contract. Of 
particular concern is the delay in setting the patronage benchmark, required to operate 
the Patronage Incentive Regime, which was supposed to come into effect from 
1 January 2014, but was ultimately not set until February 2015 because of a 
disagreement between PTV and the operator. 
PTV initially set the patronage benchmark based on six months instead of 12 months 
of data. PTV believed that the data collected by the myki systems for the first six 
months of the year was not reliable. The MMBF contract allows the benchmark to be 
set using less than 12 months of data if the data is unreliable and both parties agree to 
the alternative calculation. The operator disagreed with this approach. Once the 
benchmark was set, the operator was paid a performance incentive of over $300 000 
for exceeding its patronage target in 2013–14. It is concerning that the dispute was 
allowed to run for so long. 
4.4.4 Greenfields 
Full implementation of the MMBF's performance incentive and penalty regime will not 
occur until after the introduction of a rebuilt timetable, referred to in the contract as the 
'Greenfields timetable'. The Greenfields timetable is a redesign of MMBF services, 
including adjusted timings, some redesigned routes and cancellation of duplicated or 
low-patronage routes. It was scheduled to be introduced in April 2015, however, the 
state has recently delayed its implementation. 
The introduction of the Greenfields timetable is the point at which the MMBF 
agreement is capable of operating at its full value. The MMBF agreement was 
designed to improve services to customers, meet the demands of more passengers, 
and deliver improved punctuality. Therefore, the Greenfields timetable redesign is 
intended to deliver better targeted services than those currently operating. 
Under the MMBF agreement, the Operational Performance Regime (OPR) comes into 
force when the Greenfields timetable commences. This activates penalties of up to 
$2 million each year for underperformance. PTV believes its current data reliability 
issues will be resolved by the time Greenfields is implemented, however, any delays in 
resolution means PTV will be unable to assess the success of Greenfields or fully 
exploit the OPR. 
4.4.5 Knowledge management 
PTV does not have effective knowledge management processes in place for MMBF, 
despite having sufficient knowledge and document management systems. 
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PTV uses TRIM as its record-keeping system, but the system has not been used to 
manage MMBF information and knowledge effectively. Specifically, document control 
within TRIM has not been enforced meaning there are multiple versions of key 
documents and no clear indication of which is the final authoritative version. During the 
conduct of this audit, PTV was unable to readily produce final, approved versions of 
several key documents relating to the tender process and the management of the 
MMBF agreement.  
This poses a significant risk for PTV, as new or inexperienced personnel may 
inadvertently rely on incorrect information contained in draft documents when 
managing the contract and formulating related decisions. 
This situation means that there is an overreliance on the knowledge of individuals, 
which has not been routinely captured in a way that successors or the wider PTV 
organisation can make use of. For example, PTV referred many questions relating to 
the conduct of the tender to an individual who no longer works for PTV. Personnel will 
continue to change and new staff will have difficulty sourcing information or reasons for 
previous decisions.  
The lack of effective knowledge management also has implications for future bus 
service procurement and reform. The lessons learnt during the MMBF procurement are 
likely to be lost, as the key documents and reasons for decisions cannot be readily 
located.  
4.4.6 Contract management training and support 
PTV does not routinely supply contract management staff with specific contract 
management training. Line staff mainly learn their duties on the job, with the higher 
level managers relying on their previous experience and training. Affinitext and TRIM 
training is provided for staff, with refresher training and in-house support available, but 
this is generic system training. There is no specific training or formal induction for staff 
involved in managing the MMBF agreement. PTV provided contract management 
training for relevant staff in February 2015.  
4.5 Contract variations 
Contract variations are sometimes necessary to respond to changes in the operating 
environment, or to take advantage of innovations or unanticipated circumstances. 
However, they should not reduce the value of the contract to the state, nor should they 
be used to escape consistent underperformance. All contract variations should be 
assessed to ensure value for money is maintained, and that key elements of the 
contract are not undermined. 
There have been two variations to the MMBF agreement. While both variations were 
approved at the appropriate level and in accordance with MMBF provisions, there is no 
evidence that PTV analysed how the value of the contract would be affected. The 
impact of these variations on the original value proposition of the contract remains 
unclear.  
Managing the MMBF agreement 
 
42       Tendering of Metropolitan Bus Contracts Victorian Auditor-General’s Report 
       
 
The first contract variation was executed in August 2013, three months after execution 
of the franchise agreement. The primary purpose of this variation was to put into effect 
the financing and depot arrangements finalised following execution of the MMBF 
agreement. This is not unusual in large projects—financing arrangements are seldom 
concluded before a signed contract is in place. However, this variation also made 
changes to other aspects of the contract: 
• Patronage growth targets—the benchmark figure for the increase in the 
patronage that will occur each year decreased by approximately 113 500 
passengers. 
• Real monthly operating payment (RMOP)—the total amount paid for services 
each month was reduced by approximately $29 600 per month. 
The second variation, executed in June 2014, primarily concerned additional depot 
details finalised after the start of operations. However, it also changed other aspects of 
the contract: 
• RMOP—this payment was increased by approximately $39 000 per month above 
the price set by the first variation, cancelling out the savings gained in the first 
contract variation. The overall effect of this was to increase the price of services 
by approximately $9 500 per month, or 0.1 per cent, above the original 
agreement. PTV has noted that this increase was to take into account a cost that 
it previously understated in information it provided to tenderers. 
• Offer commitments—the requirements and deadlines for the refurbishment and 
rebranding the operator's fleet were extended, as detailed in Section 4.4.2. 
In the absence of a contract management plan, no guidance is available to MMBF staff 
on how to ensure value for money is maintained in respect of proposed variations. The 
Contract Variation PAG is insufficient, containing only high-level process guidance to 
ensure variations are properly approved.  
PTV needs to ensure that all decisions on contract variations are robust and take into 
consideration the overall effect of the changes on the contract's value proposition. In 
particular, variations regarding the performance monitoring regime should be carefully 
analysed to ensure expected performance standards are not reduced.  
PTV has processes in place to ensure that Affinitext is updated following contract 
variations. However, these are generic Affinitext processes, and are not specific to 
MMBF. There are no processes in place to ensure the MMBF CAM and PAGs are 
updated following contract variations, and there is no evidence that these documents 
were reviewed or updated following the June 2014 contract variation. MMBF's contract 
management system and processes are at risk of diverging from each other as 
Affinitext is updated while the CAM and PAGs are not. This will render the CAM and 
PAGs ineffective, as their processes will no longer reflect variations to the contract. 
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Recommendations 
That Public Transport Victoria: 
9. ensures that contract management processes are in place prior to 
commencement for any new service contracts 
10. establishes a contract management plan for the Melbourne Metropolitan Bus 
Franchise in accordance with Victorian Government Purchasing Board guidance 
11. establishes knowledge management and document control processes to ensure 
critical information and reasons for decisions are readily available to the 
necessary staff 
12. establishes a process for systematically monitoring and verifying the completion 
of required Melbourne Metropolitan Bus Franchise contract management tasks 
13. consistently enforces the terms of the Melbourne Metropolitan Bus Franchise 
agreement in accordance with the contract. 
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Appendix A. 
 Audit Act 1994 section 16—submissions and comments 
Introduction 
In accordance with section 16(3) of the Audit Act 1994, a copy of this report was 
provided to Public Transport Victoria, the Department of Economic Development, Jobs, 
Transport & Resources and the Department of Treasury and Finance. 
The submissions and comments provided are not subject to audit nor the evidentiary 
standards required to reach an audit conclusion. Responsibility for the accuracy, 
fairness and balance of those comments rests solely with the agency head. 
Responses were received as follows: 
Public Transport Victoria ............................................................................................. 46 
Department of Economic Development, Jobs, Transport & Resources ...................... 52 
Department of Treasury and Finance .......................................................................... 53 
 
 
  
Appendix A. Audit Act 1994 section 16—submissions and comments 
46       Tendering of Metropolitan Bus Contracts Victorian Auditor-General’s Report 
       
 
RESPONSE provided by the Chief Executive Officer, Public Transport Victoria 
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RESPONSE provided by the Chief Executive Officer, Public Transport Victoria –
continued 
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RESPONSE provided by the Chief Executive Officer, Public Transport Victoria – 
continued 
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RESPONSE provided by the Chief Executive Officer, Public Transport Victoria – 
continued 
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RESPONSE provided by the Chief Executive Officer, Public Transport Victoria – 
continued 
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RESPONSE provided by the Chief Executive Officer, Public Transport Victoria – 
continued 
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RESPONSE provided by the Secretary, Department of Economic Development, 
Jobs, Transport & Resources 
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RESPONSE provided by the Secretary, Department of Treasury and Finance 
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RESPONSE provided by the Secretary, Department of Treasury and Finance – 
continued 
 
 
Auditor-General’s reports 
Reports tabled during 2014–15 
 
Report title Date tabled 
Technical and Further Education Institutes: Results of the 2013 Audits (2014–15:1) August 2014 
Coordinating Public Transport (2014–15:2) August 2014 
Managing the Environmental Impacts of Transport (2014–15:3) August 2014 
Access to Legal Aid (2014–15:4) August 2014 
Managing Landfills (2014–15:5) September 2014 
Management and Oversight of the Caulfield Racecourse Reserve (2014–15:6) September 2014 
Effectiveness of Catchment Management Authorities (2014–15:7) September 2014 
Heatwave Management: Reducing the Risk to Public Health (2014–15:8) October 2014 
Emergency Response ICT Systems (2014–15:9) October 2014 
Public Sector Performance Measurement and Reporting (2014–15:10) October 2014 
Mental Health Strategies for the Justice System (2014–15:11) October 2014 
Information and Communications Technology Controls Report 2013–14 (2014–15:12) October 2014 
Auditor-General's Report on the Annual Financial Report of the State of Victoria, 
2013–14 (2014–15:13) 
October 2014 
Additional School Costs for Families (2014–15:14) February 2015 
Responses to 2012–13 Performance Audit Recommendations (2014–15:15) February 2015 
Water Entities: Results of the 2013–14 Audits (2014–15:16) February 2015 
Portfolio Departments and Associated Entities: Results of the 2013–14 Audits 
(2014–15:17) 
February 2015 
Public Hospitals: Results of the 2013–14 Audits (2014–15:18) February 2015 
Efficiency and Effectiveness of Hospital Services: High-value Equipment 
(2014–15:19) 
February 2015 
Effectiveness of Support for Local Government (2014–15:20) February 2015 
Local Government: Results of the 2013–14 Audits (2014–15:21) February 2015 
Managing Regulator Performance (2014–15:22) March 2015 
Education Transitions (2014–15:23) March 2015 
Emergency Service Response Times (2014–15:24)  March 2015 
  
Report title Date tabled 
Digital Dashboard: Status Review of ICT Projects and Initiatives (2014–15:25) April 2015 
Palliative Care (2014–15:26) April 2015 
VAGO’s website at www.audit.vic.gov.au contains a comprehensive list of all reports issued by VAGO.  
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